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I. Introduction 
 
“The case for ownership has a strong theoretical foundation”, write 
Khan and Sharma (2001, 13). Yet on the same page they note that ownership 
of IMF programmes is elusive and hard to pin down. Many others convey this 
ambivalence, usually by making strong assumptions that ownership matters 
hugely but then observing that they do not quite know what is meant by 
ownership or that there are multiple, potentially conflicting interpretations of 
the term. As EURODAD put it (2001, 3), ownership is a “slippery” term or a 
“broad concept”. Johnson and Wasty (1993, 2) argue that, notwithstanding the 
significance attached to borrower ownership by the World Bank, “the notion 
remains conceptually elusive…Notably, it is seldom made clear as to what 
constitutes adequate ownership”.1 Given the nebulous qualities of the term, it 
is used in different ways, and typically rather than being backed by analytical 
rigour it is a term invoked by association with other concepts. Or, as 
EURODAD again puts it, ownership is perhaps best seen as a “label”. The 
most common associations with this label – which does indeed seem to be 
like a brand name for contemporary aid thinking – have to do with “taking the 
initiative”, “being responsible for”, “being accountable”, “showing 
commitment”.  
 
                                                 
1
 They do not actually develop a precise definition themselves, but identify four indicators or 
characteristics of borrower ownership: the locus of initiative, the level of intellectual conviction, 
the expression of political will, and efforts towards consensus building – all of which imply 
certain assumptions about ownership rather than directly building a theoretical concept. 
In this short paper, I attempt to find what theoretical grounds might 
support the term ownership as used in aid relations and critically to discuss 
these grounds. Three possible sources for thinking through the concept are: 
property rights, relationships made or sustained through gifts, and principal-
agent theory. After setting the concept of ownership in development aid within 
the context of its origins, the paper explores the relevance and implications of 
seeing ownership as the effect of a gift, and then, in more detail, explores the 
way in which principal-agent theory has been applied to the analysis of 
ownership. Where this has been done, a particular controversy emerges 
around the relationship between ownership and conditionality: some regard 
these notions as fully compatible while others highlight the tension between 
them. 
 
Ownership of development, or of development reforms, has been 
conceived in reaction to criticisms of donor imposition of conditionality and 
also in response to donors’ own frustrations with the failings of reform 
programmes. Tsikata (2001) cites the IMF’s External Evaluation of its 
enhanced structural adjustment facility noting that “a common theme that runs 
through perceptions of EASAF at the country level is a feeling of loss of 
control over the policy content and the pace of implementation of reform 
programmes” (IMF, 1998, 36). The following concerns flow from these origins 
of the idea that ownership is one of the most powerful determinants of aid 
effectiveness: 
 
(i) Ownership is a relational concept 
This is not trivial: analysis of ownership must involve some discussion 
of the allocation of ownership, or of property rights, between relevant parties. 
Further, since property rights typically involve boundaries of one kind or 
another, where ownership is not “full” it is important to ask what kind of 
boundaries are involved, how porous, etc.  
 
(ii) Given that ownership is relational, it may involve conflict 
Much of the literature, as we shall see, presumes that real ownership is 
about consensus within a country and consensus internationally and that this 
harmony reflects the convergence of interests and objectives. Even were this 
to be the case, however, if we think of ownership in relational and property 
rights terms, clearly there is an underlying possibility or threat of force. In 
reality, interests will conflict. A further question that then arises is: what kind of 
institutional mechanisms exist to monitor ownership relations and property 
rights and to moderate conflicts over these? 
 
(iii) Ownership has emerged conceptually as a point of agreement among aid 
recipient countries, donor agencies, and international critics of policy 
conditionality in aid  
Emphasising ownership in aid relationships appeases critics of donors 
foisting their policies on developing countries. It has suited donors, including 
the IFIs, to raise the profile of ownership as a means of explaining the failure 
of conditional aid in terms of a shortfall in ownership. And ownership fits the 
need of governments to reinforce their own legitimacy by insisting on 
sovereignty. From the outset, however, it is important to distinguish between 
ownership and the policy content and design of reform programmes (or more 
broadly the object of ownership). If the policies themselves are inappropriate, 
it is unlikely that ownership will make much difference to their effects on 
growth and poverty reduction.  
 
(iv) Ownership is related to conditionality 
Is there a simple sliding scale whereby less conditionality implies 
greater ownership? Or, rather than a contradiction between conditionality and 
ownership, are the two compatible? Much of the more formal analytical work 
on ownership emerging from the IMF and World Bank has tried to show the 
case for compatibility, but, this paper argues, unconvincingly. 
 
II. Give and Take in Ownership 
 
Ownership most obviously implies property, and in development the property 
in question is presumed to be development policy. (One of the many areas of 
vagueness in the literature is precisely the question of what is to be owned; 
this is seen more clearly below, in the discussion of principal-agent theory.) In 
translating a term like ownership from the context of property rights to the 
donor-recipient aid relationship, something is left behind and something 
carried over. Because this imperfect translation – or, rather, this use of an 
imprecise metaphor – is not clearly acknowledged as such, there is room for 
multiple interpretations of the meaning of ownership in the aid relationship and 
in ‘development’ in general. Some of these meanings may contradict others. 
Consequently, the object of evaluation is uncertain from the outset. Unlike a 
market transaction involving, say, the purchase of a car, the acquisition of an 
enterprise, or buying title to a plot of land, there is no arm’s length market 
exchange in which the buyer or new owner has no obligation to the seller 
beyond fulfilling payment. Nonetheless, as we will see below, some have tried 
to treat the ownership in development notion in terms of theories originating in 
the analysis of arm’s length, financial market transactions. 
 
To the extent that there is an “after sales” relationship in such market 
exchanges, typically this involves an obligation, written into the price, on the 
part of the seller to provide future service or a product guarantee. In the 
donor-recipient relationship, by contrast, “ownership” by the recipient typically 
implies an obligation not to neglect the “product” (i.e. the development 
programme or project). The recipient bears an obligation to the donor. Clearly, 
and accurately reflecting the fact that a grant (or concessional loan) is made 
by a donor rather than a sale made by a vendor, ownership in this relationship 
derives from receipt of a gift rather than a market transaction. Indeed, it is 
psychologically well known, and a characteristic of pre-capitalist “gift 
economies”, that gifts (from parents to children, from a chief to a subject, etc.) 
often impose a burden of responsibility and obligation on the recipient. Often, 
though not necessarily, this reflects an asymmetry in the relationship between 
the donor and recipient: the gift may reinforce that asymmetry precisely by 
highlighting or creating the obligation. However, in certain situations the 
asymmetry may be levelled by an exchange of gifts in both directions, or over 
time by the use of the gifts by the recipient to erode the sources of 
asymmetry, to free him or her from gift dependency, as it were.  
 
“This is the key justification for ‘conditionality’; if you ask for a gift, you must listen to your 
patron” (Carlos Diaz-Alejandro, cited in IMF, 2001, 3). 
 
To pursue this relationship further, it is clear that aid donors using the 
term “ownership” do tie it to responsibility. One common usage of the 
ownership concept precisely carries an obligation not to neglect that which is 
owned. For example, ownership would be reflected in a road project or a 
borehole if nationals (government or district officials or even local 
beneficiaries) showed commitment to maintenance activities and, further, to 
bearing the costs of maintenance. One of the clearest expressions of this 
interpretation was made by the Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs in Sweden, Gun-Britt Andersson. She explained that the 
English term ownership does not have a clear equivalent meaning when 
translated into Swedish, thus adding to the scope for multiple, contradictory, 
and unclear interpretation. She suggested that two words in Swedish that 
captured more effectively what she thought was intended through use of 
“ownership” were responsibility and anchoring. Anchoring especially conveys 
the idea that responsibilities come with ownership and that development might 
entail a dynamic process through which the project or programme truly 
“becomes” one’s own (i.e. belonging to the developing country) and then 
loses the obligation inherent in an asymmetric donor-recipient relationship. 
This fits well with this evaluation team’s definition of ownership as dynamic, 
i.e. as a process of “owning up”. 
 
At the heart of a relationship in which the donor hopes to transfer 
ownership, but with responsibility and obligation to sustain and maintain that 
which is provided, is uncertainty on the donor’s part. For to grant ownership 
involves the risk that the obligation is not fulfilled. Aside from simple 
disappointment in this case, the risk matters because the donor agency itself 
bears responsibilities. These responsibilities fall due in two directions: to the 
taxpayers and political processes within the donor country and to the ultimate 
constituency of development aid, i.e. (certainly at present) “the poor” in 
developing countries. Therefore, the tension that is inevitable in the uncertain 
donor-recipient relationship reflects the donor’s uneasiness over giving up 
control over the development activities in question. This of course mirrors the 
“double accountability” of recipient governments, accountable not just to 
donors for the use of aid funds but also to their electorates, which again “may 
create tensions” (UNCTAD, 2000, 198). 
 
Thus, from the recognition of the responsibility content of ownership, it 
is obvious that there is an unspoken contest over control. The greater the 
genuine ownership of a set of activities by the recipient, the less the control 
the donor can exert over managing these activities. It might not always be the 
case that the recipient fully wants this kind of control. However, where control 
is attractive, this makes ownership what some economists call a “positional 
good”. Pagano (1999) defines positional goods as goods whose positive 
consumption by one party involves, necessarily, their “negative consumption” 
by another party. These are obviously relational goods. For example, if we 
see power in these terms, one person acquiring (or consuming a positive 
amount of) power over another means the other person taking up a 
subordinate position (i.e. “consuming” a negative amount of power). This is 
one way of seeing the concept of ownership, clearly relating it to “partnership”, 
stressing the inevitable relational dimension of ownership, and highlighting the 
probability that transferring ownership of this kind will involve varieties of 
tension and conflict. Indeed, if the “gift” metaphor gives us one perspective, of 
donors bearing gifts that nonetheless contain subtle power relations, the flip 
side of this perspective is that recipient countries might “take” ownership. 
Helleiner (2000, 2) argues explicitly that “ownership cannot be given – it has 
to be taken, it has to be seized, it [sic] has to be a willingness on the part of 
the local government to just plain ‘do it’, and at the appropriate points to just 
say ‘no’”. 
 
“Ownership” in aid and development, therefore, is not identical to its 
meaning in property rights and is better understood from the perspective of 
gift-giving. However, throughout the history of thought in economics and 
development runs a set of implications from property rights theory that do 
seem to be carried over into the use of the ownership concept by aid donors. 
On the one hand, ownership – and particularly private ownership – has been 
seen to matter to enterprise performance. Principal-agent theory captures the 
idea that with clearly defined property rights the owner or principal has an 
obvious and strong incentive to oversee the behaviour of agents hired to 
manage and conduct business in the enterprise, with the outcome that control 
mechanisms in the principal-agent relationship will minimise wastage and 
maximise efficiency in enterprise performance. This has been used to argue 
that publicly owned enterprises are inevitably poorly performing chiefly 
because they blur the lines of principal-agent relations by failing to establish 
clearly defined property rights. On the other hand, similar arguments have 
been combined with, often, a populist ideology to make strong claims about 
the superiority of organising rural society and production mainly on the basis 
of clearly defined property rights for family farmers and, therefore, to make a 
strong advocacy case for land redistribution in developing countries. Thus, 
both from orthodox economic theory and from the tradition of populism a 
powerful set of expectations for the consequences of “ownership” emerges. 
Arguably, this ideology lies behind the claims that ownership of development 
programmes and projects guarantees their success (not the point of this 
evaluation), while it is not precisely the source of the meaning and content of 
ownership in donor-recipient relationships (which is the point of this 
evaluation).  
 
One very clear critical point may be made here, though: in donor-
recipient relationships, property rights are far from clear. In other words, there 
is an unresolved question of who it is that owns the project, programme, 
strategy, etc. This is not clear even on the donor side; however, for now it is 
simply worth stressing that there are, regarding recipients, relatively narrow 
and very broad ideas of who should have an ownership stake. Narrow views 
focus – chiefly for reasons of technical efficiency, on government ownership. 
Broader views think true ownership rests with the participation in designing 
strategies of representatives of wider society. One of the broadest definitions 
is Helleiner’s (2000): “Local ownership is understood by this author to involve 
the widest possible participation of those who are supposed to be the 
beneficiaries”.2 
 
III. Principal-Agent Theory and the Link Between Ownership and 
Conditionality 
 
The only explicit theoretical thinking on ownership in aid relations 
appeals to principal-agent theory, commonly used in financial theory, in the 
theory of privatisation, and in other branches of economics. At the heart of 
principal-agent theory is the notion of asymmetric information and the way in 
which this can complicate market transactions and enterprise efficiency. A 
bank or financial intermediary making a loan to an individual or enterprise is 
the principal and the borrower an agent. The owner of a private manufacturing 
enterprise is a principal and his manager an agent. A farmer is a principal and 
his tenant farmers and/or workers are agents. However, a credit agency is 
presumed to know less about a specific borrower’s behaviour and options 
than that borrower; an owner of a firm does not know enough about his 
manager’s interests and actions; a farmer cannot guarantee the tenant or 
workers will act in accordance with his or her own interests and objectives. 
The uncertainty created by these situations of asymmetric information is a 
form of market imperfection. Various corrective measures may be taken to 
outwit uncertainty of this kind.  
 
Thus, Khan and Sharma argue that IMF conditionality does not reflect 
any patron-client relationship, but only the necessary counterbalance to an 
arms’ length financial transaction typical of all financial interactions. The IMF 
is the principal and the developing country the agent. Given uncertainty and 
asymmetric information, conditionality is a covenant that substitutes for 
collateral (which states cannot provide). The role of this covenant is simply to 
safeguard the IMF resources loaned out. Where there is ownership of a 
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 An arguably intermediate position is Summers’s critique of recent World Bank fashions: “I 
am deeply troubled by the distance that the Bank has gone in democratic countries toward 
engagement with groups other than governments in designing projects…when there is an 
attempt to reach within society to develop Country Assistance Strategies, there is a real 
possibility…of significantly weakening democratically elected governments” (cited in 
EURODAD, 2001, 5). 
reform programme by a government, there is not even a hint of imposition of 
this conditionality. In other words, ownership means here that the interests 
and objectives of the agent are aligned with those of the principal. From this 
reasoning, the IFIs see ownership in terms of commitment and responsibility: 
both of these reflect consensus on the objectives and interests behind reform 
policies. And commitment shores up the safeguard on the principal’s loan 
because it raises the likelihood of full programme implementation even in the 
face of some internal resistance. The World Bank seems to agree with this 
view of ownership reflected in convergence of interests and objectives with 
those of the IFIs: “Conditionality should be understood as a credible indicator 
of commitment by the Bank and its partners to support a mutually agreed 
reform process, not an attempt to force externally designed policy changes on 
unwilling governments. It represents a transparent and explicit understanding 
of sustained external support for new and ongoing program [sic], formulated 
by the country with wide participation…The program would be owned by the 
country, and conditionality would define the parameters of external support” 
(World  Bank, 2000, 1). 
 
Yet even in a fairly straightforward analysis of a relationship between 
two parties, the IMF and a government, it is not possible to exclude others. 
The IMF fears that moral hazard – the possibility of one party abusing a 
contract or loan after agreement or disbursal – is not confined to a single 
contracting agency. There is “moral hazard in teams” where the payoff to the 
principal, i.e. payments to the IMF, depends on more than one agency. 
Government ownership, in terms of commitment, helps to overcome the risk 
of this multiple-culprit moral hazard.  
 
The subtlety of the Khan and Sharma IMF perspective lies in the 
recognition that there are likely to be limits to how far the interests of 
principals and agents can be perfectly aligned. The implication of this is that 
IMF conditional programmes should reduce the number of conditions 
involved. For where there are too many objectives involved, then there is less 
chance that governments will agree with all of them. Clearly, this insight also 
suggests that ultimate “ownership” of reform programmes remains with the 
IMF. Indeed, Khan and Sharma basically acknowledge this. They note that 
most IMF programmes are signed in conditions of economic crisis. In such 
conditions and to safeguard its resources, the IMF does need conditions with 
“bite”. These are bound to provoke tensions and disagreements. 
Consequently, there cannot be “full ownership”. Therefore, given a principal-
agent framework, the aim must be to maximise ownership while minimising 
conflictual conditions. Ownership, then, would be reflected in the calm of 
consensus, not in indicators of conflict.  
 
Clearly, there are difficulties with this analytical framework. The main 
difficulty arises from the narrowly economic claims made for ownership and its 
relevance in development aid. Khan and Sharma’s paper is intended explicitly 
to dispel the idea that power relations might be relevant in a discussion of 
conditionality and ownership. The authors distance themselves from Diaz-
Alejandro’s (1984) suggestion that conditionality and ownership of aid 
involves a patron-client relationship. Even Khan and Sharma hint at an 
acknowledgement that ownership is political, but only in terms of the moral 
hazard in teams problem, or in terms of what UNCTAD (2001) calls “internal 
ownership”, the range of groups within a country that might have a stake in 
owning aid and reform. They do not accept that ownership is political in the 
relations of “external ownership”, i.e. between the government and donors.  
Yet this external relationship is not just a matter of asymmetric information but 
of contrasting interests, multiple interests, different institutional influences and 
qualities, particular histories, and so on. As Killick (1997) points out, because 
there will inevitably be such differences in the donor-recipient relationship, it is 
absurd to expect full convergence of interests and objectives. Just on the 
donor side, donors have their own policy preferences and agendas, which 
may vary over time and conflict with those of other donors; donor staff may be 
under pressure to disburse and to show quick results. These interests and 
pressures may easily undermine recipient governments efforts to seize 
ownership (Helleiner, 2000; Wuyts, ). 
 
Ownership is political (“external ownership”) in the following ways. 
Donors, certainly including the IMF and World Bank, are ideological. The 
rhetoric of ownership emerging from the IFIs implies strongly that there is no 
debate about the content of policy conditionality. Yet it is obvious that the 
superiority of the policies common to reform programmes designed by the IFIs 
is very far from self-evident. All policies, including those of laissez-faire, trade 
and general market liberalisation and deregulation, are political and involve 
changes in allocation of benefit streams and claims upon resources. Further, 
specific interests influence the policy advice and actions of organisations such 
as the IMF, not least as a function of the skewed voting rights on the IMF 
board. The IMF is not divorced from particular political and economic interests 
when it intervenes in specific ways in Indonesia, Argentina, South Korea, etc. 
And it is also obvious that the IMF has considerable power over countries in 
need of its assistance. Arguably, the IMF has a kind of monopoly power, given 
that “bilateral donors have ceded much of their decision making power, in 
respect of their programme assistance to the lowest-income countries, to the 
IMF” (Helleiner, 2000). Although no country is without bargaining power vis-à-
vis the IMF, nonetheless the IMF has a special degree of power, perhaps, 
over the least developed countries where enhancing ownership is meant to 
make the biggest difference to aid effectiveness. The naivety of the IFIs 
merger of conditionality and ownership in the convergence of interests seems 
to give the lie to the real agenda of persuasion and pushing implementation. 
For this stance elides ownership with its object. The two need to be treated 
separately, or at least more explicitly if they are only to be considered 
together. 
 
“Ownership exists when they do what we want them to do but they do so voluntarily” (one of 
the responses when donor agency representatives were asked about their understanding of 
ownership issues for Helleiner et al, 1995). As Helleiner puts it, the World Bank “now wants 
local policy makers not simply to do what it recommends but also to believe in it” (Helleiner, 
2000). 
 
Internal ownership too is political. Any government, whether or not it is 
committed to a coherent set of policies, whether or not it is formally 
accountable through the institutions of procedural democracy, etc., is a site of 
competing interests. The establishment of “consensus” is itself a political 
process. Encouraging the mechanisms and processes of consultation, 
reasonable management of social conflict, accountability, etc., will help 
formalise the politics of government policy. But there is unlikely to be some 
democratic completion: there will always be uneven influence, some voices 
will be more or less obviously suppressed, and so on. Nor is democracy really 
all about social harmony, convergence of interests. Rather, as Hirschman 
(1995), among others, argues, social conflict provides the pillars of democracy 
and social conflict is constantly renewed. Along similar lines, Stewart 
Hampshire (2000) argues that “justice is conflict”: and we may even argue 
that ownership is conflict. Ownership, genuine engagement, commitment, 
responsibility, etc., are likely to be reflected in divergence, disagreements, 
working through these conflicts, holding to a particular and possibly divergent 
policy line, etc.  
 
There is, then, a disagreement in the literature that is clearest in 
treatment of the relationship between ownership and conditionality. For the 
IMF, as we have seen, conditionality (when its wilder offshoots have been 
pruned) is entirely compatible with ownership. For the World Bank, too, 
conditionality should be seen as a “mutual commitment mechanism” (World 
Bank, 2000, 3). In contrast, Killick et al (1998) see aid conditionality as 
coercive and therefore incompatible with genuine recipient ownership. This 
paper has argued that ownership and its assumed attributes – responsibility 
and commitment – may attach to a range of possible policies and, therefore, 
cannot necessarily be compatible with the model encouraged by the Bank and 
Fund. Hence, it is entirely possible that there could be strong ownership (let 
us say, at the level of government) but conflict with external donors over 
particular policies, policy sequences, priorities, etc. And however the matter is 
put, it is impossible to cut out the element of power in the “convergence of 
interests” or conditionality as mutual accountability position: “From the 
standpoint of theory, this [ownership and conditionality] is akin to a ‘repeated 
game’ that builds reputation and trust. As long as the country remains 
committed to the program through ownership, the Bank sustains its 
commitment to engage and lend. And as long as the country remains 
committed to the path of policy reform, it remains in the relationship” 
(World Bank, 2000, 5, emphasis added). 
 
One way of seeing this is to see ownership as related to being or 
becoming a “developmental state”. This allows us to retain the relevance of 
responsibility and commitment but does not hitch those to the particular policy 
predilections of the IFIs. Two points are worth stressing. First, developmental 
states have very obviously not all succeeded by following the prescriptions of 
neo-classical economics that underpin current policy models of the IFIs 
(indeed, there has been variety in their policies and institutional set-ups).3 
Second, the process by which a state becomes a developmental state cannot 
be anything other than political. It may partly involve mobilising the ideology of 
nationalism around the project of development (and its sacrifices). It may also, 
indeed is very likely to, involve the rise to dominance of a highly specific set of 
interests, i.e. those whose survival and success depends on the firmer 
establishment and spread of capitalism.  
 
One further, small point may be made about the internal/external 
ownership distinction. The distinction may not always be very clear. Imagine, 
for example, that the government engages in consultation with a civil society 
group and takes on board in its policies some of the suggestions made by 
representatives of that group. Yet the representatives may well have their 
recommendations written by foreigners, they may be funded by external 
donors, directly or indirectly governmental, and so on. Or the government 
itself might show strong commitment to and convergence with the interests 
and objectives of the IFIs, appearing to render loan conditions merely 
“technical safeguards”; yet the commitment may emerge in reality from a very 
small part of the government, itself relying on, let us say, a study unit of the 
Harvard Institute for International Development set up within a particular 
ministry.  
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 See, for example, Amsden (2001); for a historical reflection on the highly unorthodox 
policies and institutional developments in earlier industrialising nations see Chang 
To bring the analysis back to its apparently strongest theoretical 
foundation, i.e. principal-agent theory, this theory might not really be 
appropriate to the analysis of the aid relationship. Calling the IMF the principal 
and the borrower country government the agent does not effectively capture 
this relationship. Or rather, the relationship is not a simple, arm’s length 
market one but a profoundly political relationship in many ways. It is also a 
relationship in which the government might reasonably see itself as a 
principal, especially if it does “own” development strategy, if it does really 
have a sense of commitment and responsibility. A relationship between 
principal and agent is arguably always political, involving power relations of 
one kind or another. A relationship in which two parties (and more!) regard 
themselves as principals is bound to be even more so.  
 
IV. Shared Values 
 
With convergence of interests and objectives around structural 
adjustment reform package content, and the parallel encouragement of 
democracy and “good governance”, there is a sleight of hand whereby clear 
property rights implied by ownership are washed away, leaving us with 
development aid, policy and politics as common property. For parallel to the 
economic discussion of ownership and its links to conditionality and 
performance outcomes, development programmes that are supposed to be 
locally owned typically also involve democratisation components (as well as 
human rights and governance projects). Their significance lies, again, in 
issues of dual accountability and of control. For example, SIDA regards itself 
as accountable to the Swedish population and to the population, particularly 
the poor, in a partner country such as Tanzania. Given mistrust of the state 
and political class in Tanzania (or Kenya, Uganda and other countries), giving 
up control over activities funded by Sweden makes more sense (in Sweden) if 
it can be guaranteed that these activities will be conducted in the interests of 
the Tanzanian poor. This is more likely if there is a greater degree of 
democratic accountability within Tanzania. Hence, if the checks and controls 
                                                                                                                                            
(forthcoming) who argues that the current policy framework of the IFIs amounts to “kicking 
away the ladder” by which the now advanced countries industrialised. 
on the Tanzanian state can be located within Tanzanian government and 
society rather than in SIDA itself, ownership may not only exist but be granted 
more easily.  
 
Yet there are counter-pressures that weaken the purity of this position. 
For it is well known though often unspoken that donor agencies are 
institutionally compelled to disburse. Given the fragility of democratic 
governance and, more generally, of the “shared values” invoked as the 
foundation of all aid these days, disbursement tends often to take place in 
imperfect (from the perspective of the donor) conditions.4 If there is an 
impatience to disburse, there is also an impatience to deliver ownership. For 
the rhetoric of ownership has been raised to such a resounding pitch in recent 
years that giving ownership is a priority even where mistrust and uncertainty 
on the donor’s part endure. In other words, although aid is supposed 
increasingly to flow only where there are “partnerships” with “like-minded” 
countries based on “shared values”, inevitably in many cases aid is disbursed 
and ownership encouraged even where there is obviously a very incomplete 
set of shared values and considerable doubts over how like minded the 
development partner really is. The joke goes that if Sweden were really to 
disburse aid and allow ownership only to those fully sharing Swedish social 
and political values, all Swedish aid would go to Norway alone. In reality, aid 
continues to be given to Kenya, Vietnam, and other countries far from sharing 
all agreed and stated Swedish (or British, etc.) values.5 And here too, despite 
                                                 
4
 By contrast with the diversity of interpretation of “ownership” and its merits and 
distinctiveness in relation to “partnership” and “participation”, there was extraordinary 
convergence among SIDA informants on the significance of the idea of “shared values” as a 
foundation for workable aid and almost universal, unsolicited use of the term too. Given the 
equally pervasive use of this concept in British politics and aid agencies recently (not just 
since September 11th but even more intensely since then), there might be some substance to 
Mark Duffield’s argument that while we are not in a new imperialist phase we are in an era of 
the “liberal peace”. Relations between rich and poor nations in the liberal peace are 
characterised by where developing countries are located in relation to the liberal value set of 
the rich countries. If you share our values, we will give you aid and policy advice and you will 
grow rich. Better still, we will not really need to give you policy advice or attach conditions to 
our support because your policies will reflect our shared values. See Mark Duffield, Global 
Governance and the New Wars, Zed Books, 2001, chiefly the first couple of chapters. 
5
 Stated criteria for aid rarely correlate closely with actual disbursements. Therefore, there are 
clearly always other determinants of the allocation of aid to particular countries. Overall, 
international aid is hugely over-concentrated in Egypt and Israel, for example, given that 
neither country contains a proportionate concentration of the world’s poor. And in the case of 
Swedish international aid, it seems that institutionalised aid relationships, locking mechanisms 
the wish for shared values, the reality will always be full of tension. Again, the 
tension will be both “external” and “internal”. Internally, democracy, good 
governance, etc., historically do not emerge other than through political 
struggle.  
 
In terms of ownership, there are no easy criteria for choosing who 
should have what kind of ownership stake in the project of development and 
democratisation. One of the most significant features of any serious 
discussion of development and ownership must involve the role of capitalists 
and not just “the poor” or “civil society”. For all aid nowadays is given in 
support of capitalist development and yet this involves something donors are 
often more coy about, i.e. the development of capitalism. Not to get too 
bogged down in this, aid will only really be “sustainable”, in the sense of 
helping to wean countries off aid, if that aid contributes to improving the 
conditions within which vigorous capitalists can emerge and help to exert 
influences over the state at the same time as being subject to state policy. 
Therefore, to the extent that “ownership” entails “anchoring” development 
activities, the interests of the poor need to be combined with the interests of 
capitalists prepared to undertake long-term, risky investments. Increases in 
“ownership”, therefore, are likely to involve, as a minimum, improvements in 
state capacity, a proliferation and hardening of the mechanisms by which that 
capacity can be harnessed to the interests of the poor, and the development 
of a body of national capitalists and of a set of mechanisms by which they can 
mediate their interests through a state also pressed by the claims of wider 
society. In this nexus of changes will lie, perhaps, that elusive thing commonly 
referred to as “political will”. 
 
The rhetoric of shared values may well be a political necessity in 
contemporary advanced countries but it is a diversion when trying to evaluate 
the content of ownership in development activities. Again, we may want to 
recommend retreating from this grand rhetoric (as from that of ownership) to 
                                                                                                                                            
that make it hard to withdraw aid, and a political and historical mentality of long-term 
commitment in such relationships seem at times to dominate disbursement decisions more 
than commitment to robust evidence of shared values as a precondition for aid allocation.  
focus on more modest and more precise mechanisms and processes that 
capture the objectives of development aid, one of which is presumably to 
lessen aid dependency over time, another of which is to shift the locus of 
checks and balances on politicians (or, put differently, the mechanisms 
through which social interests groups can make claims upon a state that 
mobilises them, draws revenue from them, and acts in their name).  
 
V. Implications for Evaluation  
 
I believe that this discussion can help to clarify what exactly the CDPR team 
will be looking for, and how to think about the methodology of the evaluation 
and the types of “indicator” or evidence of ownership for which we need to 
look. The discussion may also provide a basis, ultimately, for arguing that the 
language of ownership would best be refined by SIDA, and its content 
unbundled into a set of distinct concepts for which more clear evidence of 
existence and change may be available and on the basis of which more clear 
policy statements may be developed.  
 
The analysis above suggests that we need to break down the concept 
of ownership to allow for different kinds of ownership and less slippery 
components of what might or might not add up to “ownership”. It confirms that 
we will not be able to find quantitative indicators of degrees of ownership, but 
rather that we need to look for verifiable indicators of substantive content 
through a variety of mechanisms, use of these mechanisms, combinations of 
mechanisms and accumulation of sets of mechanisms into processes. Above 
all, having identified what we are looking for, we will find it in evidence of 
change, change in patterns of behaviour (financial reporting, allocation of 
personnel and other resources to maintenance, policy change in response to 
the exercise of influence by social actors through mechanisms of democracy, 
increased production of policy relevant research and also evidence in 
increased use of that locally produced research and analysis, etc.). An 
example might include SAREC support for socio-economic research in 
Tanzania. One informant expressed the view that SAREC projects had had 
very little emphasis on “ownership” in the past, being driven largely by 
Swedish interest and activity. However, this informant conceded that in spite 
of this, over time, the mechanisms employed by SAREC did gradually help to 
change things in that there emerged a larger and more able body of local 
economists. There is plenty of evidence, furthermore, that through other 
mechanisms these economists have had significant influence on policy 
debates within Tanzania and, indeed, beyond (through publications, 
participation in research networks, occupation of positions, etc.).  
If we identify such mechanisms and processes, and evidence of how they 
have worked in practice, we then need to ask what constraints hold back the 
diffusion, accumulation, and/or propagation of such mechanisms and what 
factors appear to promote their diffusion, etc.  
 
Further, we need to look for possible externalities in mechanisms of 
and evidence of local ownership. For example, if a cultural activity trust fund is 
set up with SIDA aid and if this clearly “works” – because the locally staffed 
board of the trust makes effective decisions on grant allocation, which either 
avoid excessive “opportunity hoarding” or whose opportunity concentration 
seems genuinely to be building local cultural capacity, managerial expertise, 
etc. – then is this just a self-contained example or is there a spillover into 
other areas of society, economy, and political activity?  
 
The implication is that we need to look for a variety of types of 
evidence, which need further elaboration before field trips are undertaken. 
Each team needs to have a specified list of types of evidence to guide it, but 
this list should not be exhaustive – because the conditions and types of 
ownership may vary between the case study countries. I suspect that these 
indicators can only really become clear when working through specific 
examples. Hence, methodologically, we may need to select a few examples 
for early examination by desk study to give some idea of how to proceed.  But 
it will be clear that further indicators and sources of evidence on such 
indicators will reveal themselves only during preparatory country study desk 
reviews and the field trips themselves. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
 Very little formal theory underpins the concept of ownership in 
development aid. what theoretical treatment there has been is in terms of 
principal-agent theory. There are various ways in which principal-agent theory 
is inappropriate. Above all, though, its application reveals the force of ideology 
behind the usage of ownership, insofar as principal-agent theory sets up the 
idea of an LDC doing a job for the IMF and other donors. It therefore shows 
the strong bond between ownership and conditionality in donor usage. It may 
be fair for donors to expect recipient governments to act as their agents, given 
the fiscal accountability of donor agencies. However, this is not the same as 
ownership. For rather than being reflected in a harmony over conditionality, a 
convergence of interests and objectives around the reform agenda, ownership 
may bring forth conflicts, disagreements, wilful commitment to decidedly non-
orthodox policies. The clearest implication of this paper is that ownership must 
be kept distinct from conditionality and from particular reform content. There is 
a case for retreating from theory in this case, instead stressing the 
commonplace associations with ownership more directly, i.e. responsibility 
and  commitment and exploring the diverse mechanisms and processes 
whereby these are formed and states become more clearly developmental. 
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